The Weekly Sift

This week saw the publication of two major articles about Israel, one concerning its recent policies in Gaza and the other a long-term look at the official tolerance of settler terrorism in the West Bank. “The Israeli Defense Establishment Revolts Against Netanyahu” by Yair Rosenberg in The Atlantic, describes the conflict within Israel about Netanyahu’s strategy in Gaza. “The Unpunished: How Extremists Took Over Israel” by Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti in the New York Times goes back decades to tell the story of right-wing extremists in Israel who established illegal settlements in the West Bank, terrorized Palestinians, and eventually became a threat to Israeli democracy itself.

Let’s take them in that order.

The central issue of the defense establishment’s “revolt” (which has been entirely verbal so far) is the same issue that divides Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu from President Biden: What’s the plan for Gaza’s future? Netanyahu has committed himself to nothing beyond Hamas’ total defeat, which itself is only defined vaguely. (As I explained last week, I see Hamas primarily as the idea among Palestinians that peace with Israel is impossible. If that idea is not defeated — which no purely military operation can do — a new insurgent force can reconstitute around it no matter how many fighters Israel kills or captures.)

The lack of a long-term plan for Gaza becomes a military issue because there is no post-Hamas successor government to keep Hamas from reappearing in areas that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has cleared. Consequently, soldiers have had to return to “cleared” areas two and even three times since October.

Wednesday, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant went on TV to protest his own government’s policy (or lack of policy):

Already in October, on the night of [the start of] our military maneuver [into Gaza], the defense establishment presented its war plan to the Cabinet, stating that it will be necessary to destroy Hamas battalions, while simultaneously working to establish a local, non-hostile Palestinian governing alternative.

Since October, I have been raising this issue consistently in the Cabinet, and have received no response.

The end of the military campaign must come together with political action. The “day after Hamas” will only be achieved with Palestinian entities taking control of Gaza, accompanied by international actors, establishing a governing alternative to Hamas’s rule. This, above all, is an interest of the State of Israel.

Unfortunately, this issue was not raised for debate. And worse, no alternative was brought up in its place.

Gallant alluded to the multiple long-term defense challenges Israel faces, including confrontation with Iran and its allies in Lebanon. Being bogged down endlessly in Gaza, he claimed, would sap the country’s ability to deal with those challenges. But absent a political solution for governing Gaza, he sees no alternative.

Then he threw down his gauntlet:

I will not agree to the establishment of Israeli military rule in Gaza. Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza.

The responsibility to dismantle Hamas and to retain full freedom of operation in the Gaza Strip rests on the defense establishment and the IDF, yet it depends on the creation of a governing alternative in Gaza, which rests on the shoulders of the Israeli government and all its various bodies.

Its implementation will shape Israel’s security for decades ahead.

I call on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make a decision and declare that Israel will not establish civilian control over the Gaza Strip, that Israel will not establish military governance in the Gaza Strip, and that a governing alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip will be raised immediately.

Rosenberg explains why Netanyahu won’t do that:

Netanyahu cannot publicly commit to a postwar plan for Gaza that includes Palestinians, because the day-after plan of his far-right partners is to get rid of those Palestinians.

Yesterday, standing at a lectern emblazoned with the words settlement in Gaza will bring security, the far-right minister Itamar Ben-Gvir told a rally of thousands that the only way to defeat Hamas is to “return home” to Gaza and encourage “voluntary emigration” of its Palestinian population—a euphemism for ethnic cleansing. “Tell them,” Ben-Gvir declared, “‘Go to your homes, go to your countries. This is ours now and forever.’” Shlomo Karhi, a hard-right member of Netanyahu’s faction, offered similar sentiments. “In order to preserve the security achievements for which so many of our troops gave up their lives,” he said, “we must settle Gaza, with security forces and with settlers.”

Rosenberg quotes polls saying that most Israelis reject this solution, and that Gallant is far more popular than either Netanyahu or his right-wing allies. Another popular figure, war cabinet minister Benny Gantz, joined the rebellion this weekend, threatening to resign if Netanyahu has not brought the war to some kind of conclusion by June 8, which according to the BBC would include “the establishment of a multinational civilian administration”

Back in the 80s — in my memory it’s earlier than that, but the book wasn’t written until 1980 — I remember spinning a paperback rack in a department store and finding They Must Go by Meir Kahane. I didn’t buy it, but I read enough to realize what it was: a plea for Israel to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from the lands it controlled. At the time, I had no idea anyone in Israel was seriously imagining such a thing. But Kahane was the founder of a movement that has continued and grown, and is now a significant force in Israeli politics.

“The Unpunished: How Extremists Took Over Israel” by Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti tells the story of that movement and related right-wing politics, going back to 1975 when the Israeli government decided not to remove the first illegal settlement in the West Bank.

The long arc of harassment, assault and murder of Palestinians by Jewish settlers is twinned with a shadow history, one of silence, avoidance and abetment by Israeli officials. For many of those officials, it is Palestinian terrorism that most threatens Israel. But in interviews with more than 100 people — current and former officers of the Israeli military, the National Israeli Police and the Shin Bet domestic security service; high-ranking Israeli political officials, including four former prime ministers; Palestinian leaders and activists; Israeli human rights lawyers; American officials charged with supporting the Israeli-Palestinian partnership — we found a different and perhaps even more destabilizing threat. A long history of crime without punishment, many of those officials now say, threatens not only Palestinians living in the occupied territories but also the State of Israel itself.

Events usually presented in American media as one-off lone-wolf incidents — terrorist bombings targeting West Bank mayors, two armed attacks on the Dome of the Rock mosque (in 1982 and 1994), the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and several others — are lined up and connected. Again and again, the Israeli government seems to be at war with itself: It convicts perpetrators and then pardons them, it declares settlements illegal and then funds them, it produces reports of pro-settler corruption and then buries them.

By now, individuals with deep ties to this terrorist movement are inside the government, including Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, who sit in Netanyahu’s cabinet.

To me as an American, the situation in the West Bank is reminiscent of the South during Reconstruction, when the KKK was not an official part of government, but had many allies that would wink and nod at its crimes. The article begins and ends with Palestinians from the village of Khirbet Zanuta whose homes have been destroyed, and who go to the Israeli Supreme Court hoping to get the law to protect them.

A tiny Palestinian community, some 150 people perched on a windswept hill in the West Bank near Hebron, it had long faced threats from the Jewish settlers who had steadily encircled it. But occasional harassment and vandalism, in the days after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, escalated into beatings and murder threats. The villagers made appeal after appeal to the Israeli police and to the ever-present Israeli military, but their calls for protection went largely unheeded, and the attacks continued with no consequences. So one day the villagers packed what they could, loaded their families into trucks and disappeared.

Who bulldozed the village after that is a matter of dispute. The Israeli Army says it was the settlers; a senior Israeli police officer says it was the army. Either way, soon after the villagers left, little remained of Khirbet Zanuta besides the ruins of a clinic and an elementary school.

Perhaps this kind of treatment will lead to another intifada, but maybe that’s the point.

Ehud Olmert, the former Israeli prime minister, said he believes that many members of the ultraright in Israel “want war.” They “want intifada,” he says, “because it is the ultimate proof that there is no way of making peace with the Palestinians and there is only one way forward — to destroy them.”

The Biden administration has finally begun to distance itself from the Netanyahu government. How much difference will that make?

Israel’s attack Monday night on a three-car convoy of the food-aid group World Central Kitchen brought to a head something that had been building slowly for a long time: American discontent with the war in Gaza.

Israel immediately said the attack, which left seven aid workers dead, was a mistake. But WCK Founder José Andrés wasn’t buying it:

This was not just a bad luck situation where, “Oops, we dropped a bomb in the wrong place.” … The airstrikes on our convoy I don’t think were an unfortunate mistake. It was really a direct attack on clearly marked vehicles whose movements were known by everybody at the [Israel Defense Forces].

Thursday, the report of an internal IDF investigation told a more complex story.

The IDF’s investigation concluded that the army unit involved had believed the vehicles they were tracking from the sky had been taken over by Hamas gunmen, and that they were not aware of the coordination procedures put in place between the military and World Central Kitchen for that evening.

Andrés is calling for an independent investigation.

One reason this particular incident has had such an impact on world opinion is that it is part of a larger pattern.

Scott Paul, of Oxfam, said in a briefing with other relief organisations on Thursday before the results of Israel’s investigation were released: “Let’s be very clear. This is tragic but it is not an anomaly. The killing of aid workers in Gaza has been systemic.”

“Systemic” seems very carefully chosen. It does not necessarily mean “intentional”, but it includes that possibility. What “systemic” suggests to me is a kind of indifference: As things are, aid workers die on a fairly regular basis. This fact does not cause the system to change.

According to AP (which attributes the number to the UN) “at least 180 humanitarian workers have been killed in the war so far”. Those 180 are again part of a larger whole: around 33,000 Gazans, at least 13,800 of them children, have died since the war started. A much larger number of people are at risk due to the famine developing as insufficient quantities of food are brought in.

The larger numbers, though, are harder to form clear opinions about. Some of the 33K dead were the Hamas fighters Israel has every right to target. Some civilians were Hamas supporters, and some probably ventured into places they had been told to stay out of or ignored Israeli warnings about impending attacks.

But the seven WCK workers did everything right. They told the IDF what they were doing, which centered on delivering food to people who need it. They, like the 180 dead aid workers they joined, were people risking their lives to make sure strangers got food and medical care. We are, in short, talking about seven (and 180) of the best people in the world.

Until now, the Biden administration has chosen to keep its conflicts with the Netanyahu government behind closed doors. The public would hear reports that Biden was pressuring Netanyahu to be more forthcoming in negotiations over the ceasefire-for-hostages deal the US would like to broker, but publicly the US had Israel’s back at the UN and in every other public forum. Biden has paid a fairly large political price for this among progressive Democrats, especially young people. More recently, even longtime supporters of Israel, like Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, have begun criticizing Netanyahu.

Thursday, Biden and Netanyahu had a phone call. The White House account of that call had a significantly different tone: Biden was demanding specific actions, and threatening consequences if they didn’t happen.

President Joe Biden ticked through several things that he needed to see Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu do immediately: open up the Erez crossing into northern Gaza and the port of Ashdod in southern Israel for humanitarian aid; significantly ramp up the supplies getting in through Kerem Shalom.

For now, Israel seems to be doing what Biden asked. But it will take time to see whether anything has substantively changed: Will more aid get through to Gazans? Will the famine abate? Will an attack on Rafah produce a new spike in civilian casualties? Will some kind of ceasefire-for-hostages deal actually happen? And if nothing changes, will Biden follow through with the “changes in our own policy” Secretary Blinken has suggested?

I think it’s important to keep repeating a point I’ve been making from the early days of the Gaza conflict: Americans should not be bringing this war home. American Jews are not the Netanyahu government. American Palestinians are not Hamas.

I am in complete agreement with Rabbi Mike Harvey on this point:

Memo to the bigots. Israel does not set its policies or run its war from: Synagogues, Jewish community centers, Holocaust museums, Kosher grocery markets, Jewish-owned cafes & shops

Bringing a mob to scream outside these places is an act of hate and antisemitism, not protest.

Back in 2004, before The Weekly Sift existed, I wrote a piece on DailyKos called “Terrorist Strategy 101: a quiz“. Laid out in a Q&A format, the purpose of that piece was to get people thinking differently about terrorism and anti-terrorist strategy. Its main point was that if you are a pro-X violent extremist, your primary obstacle is not the popularity of the radical anti-X position.

Quite the opposite, in fact. If you’re a violent extremist, the main obstacle to your success is the apathetic middle. Most people just want to get on with their lives, and if you give them half a chance, they’ll work out some compromise that makes you irrelevant. Your first priority, then, is to radicalize the center. “Invert the bell curve” was the way I put it. Rather than most people being the middle, you need most people to be at the extremes.

Strangely enough, your supposed enemies, the anti-X violent extremists, are in exactly the same position. So the best way things could work out for both of you is a series of tit-for-tat atrocities that produce too much collateral damage for the public to ignore. If the attacks and counter-attacks go on long enough, the center becomes untenable and the bell curve inverts. “The anti-X extremists are monsters who only understand force,” you say. “We won’t be safe until we kill them all, regardless of the innocent people who get in the way.”

And of course, after you end up killing a bunch of those innocent people, the anti-X extremists get to say the same thing about you.

History is full of examples. In Weimar Germany, you had to be a Communist because only they were tough enough to stop the Nazis. Or you had to be a Nazi, because only they were tough enough to stop the Communists. (Social Democrats? Give me a break. What are those wimps going to do?) Around the time TS101 was written, President Bush was justifying torture because he had to prevent another 9-11, and Al Qaeda was recruiting based on what Bush’s people were doing in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.

Israel/Palestine wasn’t the main focus of that article, but it did come up.

That’s why extremists come in pairs: Caesar and Pompey, the Nazis and the Communists, Sharon and Arafat, Bush and Bin Laden. Each side needs a demonic opposite in order to galvanize its supporters.

Naive observers frequently decry the apparent counter-productivity of extremist attacks. Don’t the leaders of Hamas understand that every suicide bombing makes the Israelis that much more determined not to give the Palestinians a state? Don’t they realize that the Israeli government will strike back even harder, and inflict even more suffering on the Palestinian people? Of course they do; they’re not idiots. The Israeli response is exactly what they’re counting on. More airstrikes, more repression, more poverty — fewer opportunities for normal life to get in the way of the Great Struggle.

And that brings us to the October 7 attacks. Even a casual observer had to realize that the attacks didn’t make a lot of military sense. The Israeli army was barely touched, but Hamas went after a music festival, a few kibbutzes, and some other convenient villages. They didn’t capture key generals or government officials, but instead they killed a bunch of random Israelis and took a number of ordinary folks as hostages. The Israeli military had overwhelming superiority before the attacks, and it had overwhelming superiority after.

The attack was on another level entirely, and corresponds to terrorism in its most literal sense. The point was to evoke many Israelis’ worst nightmare: the fear that they can never be safe, and that they can’t protect their loved ones. Taking Prime Minister Netanyahu’s daughter wouldn’t have served that purpose nearly so well as grabbing the children of people no one had ever heard of. You may not be special, but they aren’t either. What makes your children different?

Everyone knew that Israel could and probably would retaliate with overwhelming force. And that was the point. Over the last few years, the Arab world had been starting to forget about the Palestinians. Leaders like Saudi Arabia’s MBS were beginning to see Israel less as the Great Boogeyman and more as a potential trade partner and/or ally against Iran. More and more Arab leaders were starting to see the Palestinian problem as a nuisance, something to be contained rather than solved. So Palestinians needed the Great Jewish Boogeyman to reappear on the world stage.

Now, I’m not the only person who understands this strategy. The Israeli government has some pretty smart people in it, so they must have grasped what was happening. NYT columnist Thomas Friedman (whom I seldom agree with) raised the perfect question on October 10:

What do my worst enemies want me to do — and how can I do just the opposite?

Pretty clearly, Hamas wanted Israel to do more or less what it has done: charge into Gaza and kill a bunch of innocent people (in addition to a bunch of really horrible Hamas terrorists). AP reports:

Israel’s campaign in Gaza has killed more than 22,400 people, more than two-thirds of them women and children, according to the Health Ministry in the Hamas-run territory. The ministry’s count does not differentiate between civilians and combatants. … Much of northern Gaza, which troops invaded two months ago, has been flattened beyond recognition. … Some 85% of Gaza’s 2.3 million people have been driven from their homes and squeezed into smaller slivers of the territory. Israel’s siege of the territory has caused a humanitarian crisis, with a quarter of the population starving because not enough supplies are entering, according to the U.N. At the same time, airstrikes and shelling across Gaza continue to destroy houses, burying families taking shelter inside.

Take that, MBS! How are your negotiations with Israel going now? And you Palestinian or Israeli moderates, who still hope for peace and a two-state solution — have you persuaded anybody lately?

Now, it’s easy to be judgmental about this, and to a certain extent we should be. But we also need to appreciate just how hard Friedman’s advice is to follow. If gunmen had invaded your home, killed your spouse and carried off your children, and if you had the power to destroy everything in your path as you tried to get the children back, how restrained would you be? How open would you be to “reasonable” advice?

What needed to happen after 10-7 was some delicate combination of sticks and carrots whose restraint probably would have infuriated a big chunk of the Israeli public. Yes, Hamas can no longer be allowed to govern Gaza, and those holding Israeli hostages need to be tracked down. But Palestinians also have to be offered some kind of hope for a revitalized peace process. Otherwise, their choice is between being slowly strangled by ever-expanding Israeli settlements, and going out in a blaze of glory. The choice to become a terrorist is usually made in late adolescence, when a blaze of glory can be very appealing.

The New Yorker’s Isaac Chotiner interviewed Palestinian political analyst Ibrahim Dalalsha, who analyzed things this way:

Hamas in Gaza is three things: You have Hamas, the government, that was basically governing Gaza until October 7th. You have Hamas, the military wing, which is roughly thirty or forty thousand gunmen. And then you have Hamas as a political organization, which some politicians refer to as ideology. I think getting rid of the first—and saying, “Hamas will never govern Gaza again”—would have been a measurable and achievable goal. But the Israeli government instead went about it holistically, saying, “We will eliminate anything that has to do with Hamas or stands for Hamas.” It forgot that a political organization like Hamas has public support because Hamas stands up when Israelis apply collective punishment and discriminate against an entire population. By going against the entire Palestinian population, both in the West Bank and Gaza, they pushed all Palestinians to one side.

Now, why would Israel’s government do that? For a mixture of reasons, I imagine: Some leaders are probably as possessed by rage as anybody else; they’ve been hurt and they want to hurt somebody back. Some cynically recognize public anger as a force they can channel to raise their political power (and in Netanyahu’s case, stay out of jail). And some constitute the Israeli mirror-image of Hamas. (Remember, violent extremists come in pairs.) Just as Hamas wants to banish Jews “from the river to the sea”, they want to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from the same region.

They’re not going to do that by making peace. They need to keep the pot stirring until the bell curve completely collapses and a majority of Israelis see ethnic cleansing as the only answer. Two of them, Israel’s finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and national defense minister Itamar Ben Gvir, more-or-less said that recently.

each suggested the war in Gaza could result in the resettlement of the Palestinian people.

Smotrich told reporters Monday that the solution to the war was “to encourage the voluntary migration of Gaza’s residents to countries that will agree to take in the refugees,” The Times of Israel reported.

Ben Gvir echoed similar sentiments, telling reporters Monday that the war offers an “opportunity to concentrate on encouraging the migration of the residents of Gaza,” according to the outlet.

“We cannot withdraw from any territory we are in in the Gaza Strip. Not only do I not rule out Jewish settlement there, I believe it is also an important thing,” Ben Gvir said.

A US State Department spokesman commented:

We have been told repeatedly and consistently by the Government of Israel, including by the Prime Minister, that such statements do not reflect the policy of the Israeli government.

Maybe so. But nonetheless members of the cabinet are making such statements in public. So we know those ideas are being discussed within the government. Palestinians know it too. And that makes the job of Hamas recruiters so, so much easier.

One of the countries where democracy is currently in serious trouble is Israel. The Knesset is considering a proposal by Prime Minister Netanyahu to make the Supreme Court inferior to the Knesset; by majority vote the Knesset could reverse court decisions. It would also claim the right to nominate new judges, taking that power away from a less partisan commission.

That may sound like a few technical adjustments, but it undoes a key part of the liberal-democratic social contract, in which majority rule is tempered by an independent judiciary that protects the rights of minorities. Under Netanyahu’s proposal, controlling a parliamentary majority would allow him to do pretty much whatever he wants, possibly including quash a corruption case against him.

Massive numbers of Israelis see this threat, and have been on the streets protesting for weeks. NYT columnist Thomas Friedman describes this as Israel’s “biggest internal clash since its founding”, and argues that American Jews cannot stay neutral.

At a deeper level, the current crisis goes back to a tension that has existed from the beginning: Israel views itself as both a democracy and a Jewish state. Both elements are central to its identity, but they have always fit together uneasily.

This tension is not unique to Israel; it exists whenever a nation thinks of itself as both a democracy and a homeland for a particular ethnic, religious, or cultural group. We can also see it in Orban’s Hungary or Modi’s India, not to mention the Christian nationalist fantasies of the American Right. Democracy insists that all citizens are equal, but the X-homeland vision makes the members of Group X special.

The two identities can coexist without too much friction as long as Group X has a comfortable voting majority and the deal it offers not-X citizens is good enough to win their acquiescence. Historically, and glossing over a lot of counterexamples, the deal in Israel has been that Arab parties are locked out of any ruling coalition in the Knesset, but the judicial system is committed to defend the rights of Palestinian Israelis as individuals.

That tension is also what makes the problem of the occupied territories so intractable: If Israel annexes the territories outright and makes them part of Israeli democracy, the Jewish voting majority is threatened, and the new Palestinian citizens have such a long history of conflict with Israel and with Jewish settlers that many of them could not acquiesce to peaceful membership in a Jewish state. But continuing to rule the territories as an occupying power creates an undemocratic Jew/Arab relationship that can’t help but cross the border into pre-1967 Israel and affect Israeli citizens.

So Netanyahu’s push for the elected government to take control of the courts is not only corrupt (motivated largely by Netanyahu’s personal legal problems) and undemocratic in general (since it undoes the rule of law), but it strikes at the heart of the historical compromise between the Jewish state and Israeli democracy. Going forward, the Jewish voting majority would be empowered to rule unchecked, with regard for the equal rights of non-Jews shrinking into a secondary position, from which it could conceivably vanish entirely.

Ordinarily, I would find myself 100% on the side of democracy and opposed to the homeland vision. That’s how I feel about Christian nationalism in America, as well as Hindu nationalism in India, and so on. But Israel’s unique history muddies things up for me. The lesson many people drew from World War II — and it’s hard to argue that they’re entirely wrong — is that the world needs a Jewish homeland somewhere.

You don’t have to believe that the Jews are God’s chosen people to recognize that they have been chosen to be targets of bigotry again and again. For reasons I don’t fully understand, antisemitism appears to be a unique strain of prejudice. (I wish I knew who to credit for this line, but sometime in the last year or two I heard this explanation of why American Jews should be uneasy with the conspiracy-theory-promoting American Right, even if it purports to be pro-Israel: “Anybody who believes crazy things will eventually believe crazy things about Jews.”)

Even in places where it appears to waning, antisemitism can pop back up. Jews seemed to be gradually assimilating into Germany prior to Nazism. The Bolshevik Revolution had a place for Jewish leaders like Trotsky before antisemitism reasserted itself under Stalin. An American president whose daughter converted after marrying a Jew could nonetheless wink and nod at American Nazis chanting “Jews will not replace us”, and traffic in rhetoric that led a man to massacre Jews in a Pittsburgh synagogue.

So a decade or two ago I might have scoffed at the idea that American Jews would ever need an escape plan or an obvious place to land. I still think it’s unlikely. But unimaginable? I not as sure as I used to be. The world, I think, still needs Israel.

Simultaneously, though, I have no answer for a Palestinian who wonders why he has to be a second-class citizen (or not a citizen at all) in the land where his ancestors have lived for centuries. And while I can’t offer a simple solution to the democracy/homeland tension, I have to believe there’s a better way to protect the Jewish homeland than establishing an Orban-style autocracy-with-democratic-trappings. So I’m rooting for the protesters.

It’s such a simple idea: If the Palestinians just surrender all their claims and accept whatever Israel is willing to give them, then there will be peace!
Why didn’t somebody think of this sooner?

As soon as the Palestinians realize how easily they can achieve peace — just give up — I’m sure they’ll get on board with the “Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People” the Trump administration unveiled Tuesday. How can they refuse if Jared Kushner keeps sweet-talking them like this?

You have five million Palestinians who are really trapped because of bad leadership. So what we’ve done is we’ve created an opportunity for their leadership to either seize or not. If they screw up this opportunity — which, again, they have a perfect track record of missing opportunities — if they screw this up, I think they will have a very hard time looking the international community in the face, saying they’re victims, saying they have rights.

Such a charmer, that young man. I wonder if he was this endearing when he proposed to Ivanka. (“Say yes. You don’t want this relationship to fail like all your others have.”) Later on in the same interview, we get to this:

The Palestinian leadership has to ask themselves a question: Do they want to have a state? Do they want to have a better life? If they do, we have created a framework for them to have it, and we’re going to treat them in a very respectful manner. If they don’t, then they’re going to screw up another opportunity like they’ve screwed up every other opportunity that they’ve ever had in their existence.

Can’t you just feel the respect? Why wouldn’t you want to make a deal with somebody who sees you as a perennial screw-up?

Of course, Jared’s “state” is a euphemism for something far less than a state. As the map above shows, it is a collection of isolated regions, two of which are connected by a fantasy tunnel. Amir Tibon describes it like this in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz:

The solution that the Trump plan offers to this situation is the creation of a Palestinian “state” that could potentially be established four years from now, in the areas of the West Bank that will not be annexed by Israel. This future state, however, will have none of the actual characteristics of a state. The streets of all of its cities, towns and villages, as well as the roads connecting them, will be under the full control of the military of another state – Israel. It will have no control over its borders, which will also be controlled by Israel.

In addition, this state, despite Trump’s claim that it will have territorial continuity, will in fact be dissected by Israeli settlements that will remain as “enclaves” inside its territory and will be under full Israeli sovereignty. This means that Palestinian citizens of the future “state” could still stand at Israeli checkpoints – not at the border points between their state and Israel, but well inside their own state, between one town and the next. The official reason for these checkpoints could easily be given as the need to protect the Israeli communities located within Palestinian territory.

The chance that any Palestinian leader agrees to accept such a “state” under these conditions is nonexistent. What the Trump plan is offering the Palestinians is basically to take the existing reality – living under Israeli military occupation, with settlements spread in-between their cities, towns and villages – and to enshrine it by labeling it as a state.

The animating philosophy of the proposal is Might makes Right. Israel is stronger, and the Palestinians will never get rid of their Israeli overlords by force. So they should just give up. Forget about the ways they’ve been victimized, stop talking about having rights, and just take whatever the Israelis are willing to offer. Because if they don’t, the next offer will be worse. Israeli news anchor Eylon Levy said as much in the Washington Post:

[The plan] recognizes that any solution has to work with the fact that Israel has basically won, instead of denying it or attempting to reverse it.  … Throughout history, the victors have always dictated the ultimate terms of peace. Is that fair? Maybe. Is it how the world works in reality? Yes. Conflicts don’t end when both sides agree they are tired of fighting; they end when one side, the loser, recognizes it can’t keep up the battle and decides to get what it can before things get worse.

You’d think a culture that makes a shrine out of Masada would understand: At some point you just don’t care that the other side is stronger. You’re not expecting victory any more; you’re just trying to make your enemies respect you.

Coincidentally, Jared’s argument resembles the one Trump used to make to the contractors he shafted: It doesn’t matter who’s right. My lawyers can bankrupt you, so just take whatever I decide to pay you and be happy.

The announcement of the plan made a nice media-distraction event for Trump and for Bibi Netanyahu. Trump, of course, had an impeachment trial going on in the Senate, while Netanyahu is under indictment for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust.

Shortly after the announcement, Netanyahu’s administration said the cabinet would vote Sunday to annex the major Jewish settlements on the West Bank, the ones that just about every country but the US and Israel think violate international law. But that vote didn’t happen, and Kushner is suggesting that it be delayed until after the Israeli elections in March.

Saturday, the Arab League unanimously rejected the plan.

For what it’s worth, I keep repeating the same analysis of the conflict. I see four possible resolutions.

1. Two states, Israel and a new state where Palestinians have actual territory and self-determination.
2. One democratic state, in which Palestinians become citizens of Greater Israel, and may eventually become a voting majority.
3. One Jewish ethno-state, where Palestinians are a subject population, possibly with a puppet-government to save face.
4. One Jewish ethno-state, from which Palestinians have been ethnically cleansed.

Every year, (1) and (2) seem less and less likely. Getting to either one involves building trust — Northern Ireland could be a model — but both sides seem intent on building distrust instead. Partisans of either side can give you a long list of events proving that the other side can’t be trusted and doesn’t really want peace.

The status quo is basically (3), and Jared’s peace plan seems designed to kill off (1) and lock (3) in place. Even so, though, (3) seems unstable to me. I don’t think the Palestinians will ever accept it, and at some point I think the Israelis will decide that the Palestinians are ungovernable.

That leaves (4), which is what I think will eventually happen. It will be a traumatic thing for the Israeli people to see themselves do, which is why it will take another couple decades for them to work up a sufficient self-justification. But the extreme right wing of Israeli politics is there already, and that seems to me to be the direction everything is drifting.