The Weekly Sift

Can Trump decide for himself the extent of his own power?

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Many of the Trump administration’s most controversial actions are based on novel (and perhaps far-fetched) interpretations of existing laws. The most objectionable deportations are based on a bizarre reading of the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, and soon the Supreme Court will have to rule on whether it really does give Trump he power he claims. Similarly, many of the tariffs he has declared are based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977.

But the same question arises: In the IEEPA, Congress delegated certain powers to the President. But did it delegate these powers, to be used in this situation.

Wednesday, the United States Court of International Trade said no.

The argument. Simplifying somewhat, the Trump administration argues that the IEEPA gives Trump essentially unlimited powers over tariffs. He can invoke the IEEPA by declaring a national emergency of his choosing, and once he does, the emergency powers Congress has delegated to the President allow him to do just about whatever he wants. Courts have no power to intervene, because the existence of an emergency and the measures necessary to deal with it are “political questions” that unelected judges have no business resolving.

The counter-argument is that emergency laws like the IEEPA delegate specific powers with limitations, not dictatorial powers for the President to use however he likes. Even if you could interpret the language of the law to grant unlimited power, that would itself be unconstitutional: Congress can only delegate its power up to a point.

Moreover, the courts have a necessary role in interpreting whether a President’s use of an emergency power is within the limitations of the statute. Otherwise we’re back in the dictatorial situation: The President has as much power as he says he has, and no one can say otherwise.

Ordinary tariffs. Some background: Presidents don’t ordinarily make tariffs. Tariffs are taxes, and the Constitution assigns Congress “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”. Congress is also empowered to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”. So that’s typically how tariffs get done: Congress passes a law establishing them, like the ill-fated Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.

This Congress has not passed a tariff bill, and Trump has not asked it to. Instead he has invoked the IEEPA, which Wikipedia describes like this:

The IEEPA authorizes the president to declare the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat … to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States” that originates “in whole or substantial part outside the United States.” It further authorizes the president, after such a declaration, to block transactions and freeze assets to deal with the threat and requires the president to report to Congress every 6 months on the circumstances, threats and actions taken. In the event of an actual attack on the United States, the president can also confiscate property connected with a country, group, or person that aided in the attack.

IEEPA falls under the provisions of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), which means that an emergency declared under the act must be renewed annually to remain in effect.

A textbook example of the IEEPA in action was what President Bush II did after 9-11: He declared an emergency and blocked the assets of organizations identified as terrorist.

Emergency tariffs. Tariffs come into the picture because President Nixon used a predecessor of IEEPA (the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, or TWEA) to raise tariffs across the board. That action was contested in court, and an appeals court reversed a lower-court finding that the tariffs exceeded the power Nixon was delegated under TWEA. In reversing that decision, the higher court emphasized that the President’s power was not unlimited. Nixon had

imposed a limited surcharge, as a temporary measure calculated to help meet a particular national emergency, which is quite different from imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable

After that ruling, Congress passed IEEPA to pull back some of the power it had delegated to the President. The TWEA powers were now reserved for wartime, while IEEPA covered “national emergencies” short of war. These powers

may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose.

Questions related to the balance of trade are dealt with in a separate piece of legislation: Section 122 of the Trade Act, where the President’s powers are still more restricted: Tariff surcharges are limited to 15% and 150 days.

But the Trump administration’s position in court is that the IEEPA’s delegation of power is essentially unlimited: It’s up to the President to decide what a national emergency is and what measures are necessary to “deal with” it. Courts can’t second-guess him, because that’s a “political question” off limits to the unelected judiciary. (So if the President declares that vaping constitutes a national emergency and banning pogo sticks is necessary to deal with it, courts have no power to intervene.)

The court didn’t buy any of that. The language of the statute is not the President’s to interpret.

This language, importantly, does not commit the question of whether IEEPA authority “deal[s] with an unusual and extraordinary threat” to the President’s judgment. It does not grant IEEPA authority to the
President simply when he “finds” or “determines” that an unusual and extraordinary threat exists. … Indeed, “[t]he question here is not whether something should be done; it is who has the authority to do it.” [Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 501]. The court simply asks whether the President’s action “deal[s] with an unusual and extraordinary threat.” Congress provided the necessary standards for resolving this inquiry when it enacted IEEPA, and the court’s task is to apply them.

Which tariffs are at issue? Trump used IEEPA authority to impose tariffs of three types

• worldwide tariffs. The 10% tariff on all imports.
• retaliatory tariffs. The country-by-country tariffs Trump announced on “liberation day”.
• trafficking tariffs. Tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and China to pressure them to prevent fentanyl smuggling into the US.

The court rejects all of them. There are other tariffs, including tariffs on metals and car parts, that Trump invoked on other authorities. Those were not questioned.

Nondelegation and Major Questions. During the Biden administration, the Supreme Court created new legal principles to restrain executive power. Nondelegation is essentially the idea that certain powers are so central to Congress’ role that they can’t be delegated. So legislation that delegates those powers broadly, rather than in very specifically defined circumstances, is unconstitutional.

The major questions doctrine says that large-scale grants of power to the executive branch must be made explicitly in the authorizing legislation. For example, the Court used this doctrine to knock down President Biden’s cancellation of student debt. The authorizing legislation allowed the executive branch to tinker with student loan repayments. But if Congress had intended to allow the President to cancel over a trillion dollars of debt, it would have said so explicitly.

Findings. The Court of International Trade found that Trump’s worldwide and retaliatory tariffs were balance-of-trade remedies that belonged under the restrictions of Section 122, not the IEEPA. A trade deficit by itself is not an “unusual and extraordinary threat” that invokes IEEPA emergency powers.

The President’s assertion of tariff-making authority in the instant case, unbounded as it is by any limitation in duration or scope, exceeds any tariff authority delegated to the President under IEEPA. The Worldwide and Retaliatory tariffs are thus ultra vires and contrary to law

The trafficking tariffs fail because they do not “deal with” the emergency that the President has declared. Fentanyl smuggling may well be a national emergency, but the connection to tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China is too indirect and tenuous.

“Deal with” connotes a direct link between an act and the problem it purports to address. A tax deals with a budget deficit by raising revenue. A dam deals with flooding by holding back a river. But there is no such association between the act of imposing a tariff and the “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” that the Trafficking Orders purport to combat.

Trump argues that the tariffs are necessary to put pressure on the targeted nations, so that they will crack down on fentanyl smuggling.

The Government’s “pressure” argument effectively concedes that the direct effect of the country-specific tariffs is simply to burden the countries they target. It is the prospect of mitigating this burden, the Government explains, that will induce the target countries to crack down on trafficking within their jurisdictions. See Gov’t Resp. to Oregon Mots. at 39. But however sound this might be as a diplomatic strategy, it does not comfortably meet the statutory definition of “deal[ing] with” the cited emergency. It is hard to conceive of any IEEPA power that could not be justified on the same ground of “pressure.”

The Government’s reading would cause the meaning of “deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” to permit any infliction of a burden on a counterparty to exact concessions, regardless of the relationship between the burden inflicted and the concessions exacted. If “deal with” can mean “impose a burden until someone else deals with,” then everything is permitted. It means a President may use IEEPA to take whatever actions he chooses simply by declaring them “pressure” or “leverage” tactics that will elicit a third party’s response to an unconnected “threat.” Surely this is not what Congress meant when it clarified that IEEPA powers “may not be exercised for any other purpose” than to “deal with” a threat.

The ruling concludes:

In so holding, the court does not pass upon the wisdom or likely effectiveness of the President’s use of tariffs as leverage. That use is impermissible not because it is unwise or ineffective, but because [the law] does not allow it.

What happens now. The International Trade Court is not the final authority, and the administration has already appealed to the appellate court for the Federal Circuit. That court has put a stay on the ITC’s ruling until it has time to consider the case. Ultimately, this is probably headed to the Supreme Court.

That will be an interesting test for this Supreme Court, which expanded its own power to overrule presidential orders during the Biden administration. But do the same limitations apply to Democratic and Republican presidents? Or has the law become partisan, so that what was done matters less than who did it?

The politics. The Trump administration interprets all its losses in court as judges making their own policy decisions and trying to impose them on the executive branch. Stephen Miller, for example, decried how “15 Communist judges” spread through the courts can “block and freeze each executive action”.

That framing allows Trump’s people to describe the issues the way they want, and then say that judges are against what the administration is for. Trump wants to deport dangerous criminals, while judges want to stop him. Trump wants to defend our economy from predatory foreign countries, but judges want to stop him, and so on.

But that framing sidesteps whether the United States will continue to be a country of laws, or whether it will become a Trump dictatorship. The Constitution defines the powers of our government, and assigns them to different branches. When Trump gathers all those powers to himself — and more powers that the Constitution does not assign to anyone — our way of life is endangered.

Whatever legitimate goals Trump may have — deporting criminals or protecting American jobs or whatever — can be accomplished in legal ways. (For example, Trump could ask Congress for a new tariff law. He could deport criminals through the immigration courts.) When he ignores legal pathways in favor of illegal ones, he needs to be stopped.